What QuantLayer defends, and what it assumes.
Security claims here are the ones the code enforces and the tests exercise. Where the system rests on a trust assumption, this page names it.
Security principles
- No private keys on servers
- No QuantLayer backend accepts, stores, logs or serialises a private key. Custody keys stay sealed in the Rust module.
- Single-use authorization
- A signed authorization is valid for one operation, on one subject, at one service, once, for a short time.
- Fail closed
- Unknown algorithms, malformed evidence, missing attestors and incompatible protocol versions are refusals.
- No faked results
- A verification either runs or the call fails; nothing reports success it did not compute.
Threat model
| Threat | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| A stolen API key | Keys are scoped, revocable, never stored (only an HMAC verifier), and rate-limited. A key cannot manage projects or other keys. |
| A replayed signature | Every identity and authorization signature is bound to a single-use challenge or nonce, an audience and a short expiry. |
| A substituted key | New keys must prove possession; rotation is authorised by a current key; algorithm confusion fails closed. |
| A forged proof or presentation | Proofs are bound to the request context and nullifier; presentations to an audience and a nonce; credentials to a holder commitment. |
| A compromised server database | No private key is stored; custody secrets are sealed under a key-encryption key; sensitive aggregates are encrypted with per-row associated data. |
| A malicious contract address | The SDK reads addresses only from deployment records and checks their bytecode fingerprint before any call. |
| A colluding attestor quorum | Not prevented: post-quantum on-chain verification trusts the attestor threshold. Results report Attested, never Trustless. |
Cryptographic assumptions
- Lattices and hashes
- ML-DSA and ML-KEM rest on Module-LWE; SLH-DSA on the security of SHA-2.
- Classical
- Ed25519 and secp256k1 rest on elliptic-curve discrete logarithms, which a large quantum computer would break. Hybrid mode requires both halves.
- Zero-knowledge
- UltraHonk over BN254 with a KZG setup (the Aztec ceremony reference string) and Poseidon as the in-circuit hash.
- Randomness
- Keys and nonces come from the platform CSPRNG (Web Crypto, or the operating system in Rust).
Key management
- Identity keys
- Held by the user: in the web application, as non-extractable Web Crypto keys in the browser.
- Custody keys
- Generated in Rust, sealed under the platform KEK, decrypted only for the operation, erased on revocation.
- API keys
- Shown once at creation; scoped; revocable; never stored in plain form.
- Sessions
- Wallet sessions live in httpOnly, SameSite=Strict cookies, never in browser storage.