What QuantLayer defends, and what it assumes.

Security claims here are the ones the code enforces and the tests exercise. Where the system rests on a trust assumption, this page names it.

Security principles

No private keys on servers
No QuantLayer backend accepts, stores, logs or serialises a private key. Custody keys stay sealed in the Rust module.
Single-use authorization
A signed authorization is valid for one operation, on one subject, at one service, once, for a short time.
Fail closed
Unknown algorithms, malformed evidence, missing attestors and incompatible protocol versions are refusals.
No faked results
A verification either runs or the call fails; nothing reports success it did not compute.

Threat model

ThreatMitigation
A stolen API keyKeys are scoped, revocable, never stored (only an HMAC verifier), and rate-limited. A key cannot manage projects or other keys.
A replayed signatureEvery identity and authorization signature is bound to a single-use challenge or nonce, an audience and a short expiry.
A substituted keyNew keys must prove possession; rotation is authorised by a current key; algorithm confusion fails closed.
A forged proof or presentationProofs are bound to the request context and nullifier; presentations to an audience and a nonce; credentials to a holder commitment.
A compromised server databaseNo private key is stored; custody secrets are sealed under a key-encryption key; sensitive aggregates are encrypted with per-row associated data.
A malicious contract addressThe SDK reads addresses only from deployment records and checks their bytecode fingerprint before any call.
A colluding attestor quorumNot prevented: post-quantum on-chain verification trusts the attestor threshold. Results report Attested, never Trustless.

Cryptographic assumptions

Lattices and hashes
ML-DSA and ML-KEM rest on Module-LWE; SLH-DSA on the security of SHA-2.
Classical
Ed25519 and secp256k1 rest on elliptic-curve discrete logarithms, which a large quantum computer would break. Hybrid mode requires both halves.
Zero-knowledge
UltraHonk over BN254 with a KZG setup (the Aztec ceremony reference string) and Poseidon as the in-circuit hash.
Randomness
Keys and nonces come from the platform CSPRNG (Web Crypto, or the operating system in Rust).

Key management

Identity keys
Held by the user: in the web application, as non-extractable Web Crypto keys in the browser.
Custody keys
Generated in Rust, sealed under the platform KEK, decrypted only for the operation, erased on revocation.
API keys
Shown once at creation; scoped; revocable; never stored in plain form.
Sessions
Wallet sessions live in httpOnly, SameSite=Strict cookies, never in browser storage.